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Abstract. Phenomenology in Anglo-American philosophy is interpreted as a philosophical trend describing subjective experience and therefore unable to answer the question: how brain generates consciousness. The paper considers why phenomenology isn’t usual subjective introspectionism, and in what way it is possible to naturalize phenomenology. Also the problems are described, which don’t allow the project of phenomenology naturalization to answer the question about the interconnection of brain and consciousness.
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Key words and phrases: феноменология, нейрофизиология, сознание, интроспекционизм, квалиа, нейрофеноменология, редукция, phenomenology, neurophysiology, consciousness, introspectionism, qualia, neurophenomenology, reduction
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Русский
